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Abstract: This paper is divided into three parts. The first 
part will provide a general overview of some major 
approaches in the discussion on the relationship between 
Islam and liberalism. Following this, the next section will 
briefly elaborate Talal Asad’s notion of Islam as ‘a 
discursive tradition’ and John Rawls’ distinction between 
liberalism and political liberalism and how they might 
contribute to the discussion on the relationship between 
Islam and liberalism. In the final part, the paper will then 
present a general observation on the evolving encounter 
between Islam and liberalism in Indonesia and the 
accompanying debate over this encounter among major 
Islamic groups in the country. In doing so, it will be argued 
that while liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine has been, 
and will remain, contested among Indonesan Muslims, 
there has been a growing support among them for ‘political 
liberalism’, although not in a purely Ralwsian sense. 
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Introduction: Rethinking Islam and Liberalism 
There are many approaches adopted by scholars in discussing the 
relationship between Islam and liberalism. Two approaches, however, 
seem to be dominant. The first approach centers on what is assumed 
to be the basic values and traditions of both Islam and liberalism and 
the degree to which they are compatible. Two main perspectives 
emerge from this approach. The first is what might be called as 
‘univocal’ perspective and the second is what is described as 
‘multivocal’ perspective. While the first approach focuses its scope of 
analysis on the importance of religious tradition and sacred text, the 
second approach is based more on human agency and context rather 
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than foundational texts or basic tenets of tradition. Scholars 
subscribing to the second approach acknowledge in varying degrees 
the contingent relationship between, ‘texts’, human agency and 
changing historical socio-political context. 
On the other hand, scholars using a ‘univocal’ perspective tend to 
define Islam as a fixed and unitary entity. This fixed and monolithic 
entity is construed as either essentially compatible or incompatible with 
liberalism. The proponents of this perspective, however, mostly point 
to and argue for the latter. In this perspective, Islam is thus understood 
to be inherently incompatible or having basic problems with Western 
ideals and ideologies, including liberalism. Bernard Lewis, Samuel 
Huntington, and Francis Fukuyama are widely associated with this 
perspective. Lewis, for example, suggests that Muslims have a deeply 
rooted hatred toward the West and this hatred “goes beyond hostility 
to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries and 
becomes a rejection of Western civilizations as such, not only what it 
does but what it is.”1 Echoing Lewis, Huntington also famously claims 
that “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic 
fundamentalism. It is Islam.”2 In a similar vein, Fukuyama argues that 
Islam is “one major world culture that arguably does have some very 
basic problems with modernity.”3 
In contrast to this ‘univocal’ perspective, ‘multivocal’ perspective 
shows and emphasizes the diversity within Islamic tradition, some of 
which are hospitable to and compatible with liberal political values. 
For this perspective, Islam, like any other religious traditions, provides 
doctrinal and institutional sources for both liberal and illiberal or non-
liberal political discourse and culture. Alfred Stepan, among others, is 
the main proponent of this perspective. On the question of the 
relationship between non-Western religions and democracy and what 
he calls as ‘twin toleration’, Stepan argues that “it is appropriate not to 
assume the univocality, but to explore whether these traditions contain 
                                                 
1 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the 
West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified,” Atlantic Monthly, September 
1990. Available online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sept/rage.htm. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 217 
3 Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne 
(eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (New York: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2002), pp. 31-32  
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the multivocal components that are usable for (or at least compatible) 
with the political construction of twin tolerations.”4 
Univocal perspective has been increasingly challenged and 
criticised for its essentialist and totalizing premises. The main problem 
of this perspective, as its critics argue, is its reductive reference to 
Islam as a surrogate idea or usage for unitary faith, history, or socio-
economic condition.5 It is thus discredited for having failed to capture 
the complex nature of religious movements and ignoring the intimate 
relationship between religious discourses and different and changing 
socio-political contexts. Edward Said, one of the most prominent 
critics of Orientalism, pejoratively illustrates this kind of perspective as 
expending “thousands of words without a single reference to people, 
periods, and events.”6 
Multivocal perspective, on the other hand, has been more widely 
accepted. It is not, however, without problems.  While it is praised for 
moving away from essentialist and totalizing tendencies, it has little to 
say on how certain discourses are at times and in different contexts 
dominant or hegemonic within particular religious traditions. In other 
words, while it acknowledges the possibility of compatibility between 
(some of) religious traditions and ‘secular’ ideas, it still fails to ascertain 
whether and and in what condition these compatible religous 
discourses prevail and come into dominance.7 It is here that a historical 
and contextual approach has more explanatory power.  
According to the latter perspective, Muslim discourses and the 
actors who articulate them are historically situated. The scripture or 
religious texts should not be used to attribute homogeneity to Muslim 
                                                 
4 Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy and ‘Twin Toleration’,” Journal of Democracy, 11, 
4 (October 2000), p. 44. 
5 Critical accounts of essentialist perspective can be found, among others, in Aziz Al-
Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London, New York: Verso, 1993); John L. Esposito and 
John A. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996); Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle 
East (London: IB Tauris, 2003);  Amyin B. Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World: 
Contemporary Perspectives (London: IB Tauris, 2002); Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist 
Politics, Culture, the State and Islamism (London: IB Tauris, 2003) 
6 Edward Said, “Scholars, Media and the Middle East,” in G. Viswanathan (ed.), Power, 
Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward Said (New York: 2001), p. 297. 
7  See John Anderson, “Does God Matter, and If So Whose God?: Religion and 
Democratization,”  Democratization, 14, 4 (August 2007), p. 193. 
  373 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Islam and Liberalism 
societies since they are subject to competing readings and defined by 
and large according to their social existence.8 As a result, their insertion 
into particular contexts with different power relations results in “a 
multitude of discourses that must be accounted for reference to the 
power position at stake.”9 Muslim political discourses in other words 
are “part of changing institutions, and discourses which can be, and 
often are, contested and reconstituted.”10 The highly essentialist claims 
such as the clash of civilizations suggested by Huntington thus “only 
serve to obfuscate the real dynamics of the struggle between 
interpretative communities over who gets to speak for Islam and 
how.”11 
Islam as ‘A Discursive Tradition’ 
Central to the understanding of Muslim discourse as explained 
above is Talal Asad’s notion of Islam as ‘a discursive tradition’. 
Collapsing the binary opposition between tradition and modernity, 
Asad affirms the significance of tradition as a meaningful and binding 
relationship and orientation of the present (and future) to the past.12 
Far from being a past-oriented, a discursive tradition as defined by 
Asad has a dynamic relationship with  
“a past (when the authentic practice was instituted) and a 
future (how a correct performance and its fruits can be 
secured in future) through a present (how it is linked to 
other practices, institutions, and social conditions).”13  
The Islamic discursive tradition is therefore understood as a 
“historically evolving set of discourses, embodied in the practices and 
institutions of Islamic societies and hence deeply imbricated in the 
                                                 
8  See Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007) 
9 Salwa Ismail, Islamist Politics, Culture, the State and Islamism (London: IB Tauris, 2003), 
pp. 16-7. 
10 See Talal Asad, “Ideology, Class and the Origin of the Islamic State,” Economy and 
Society, 9, 4 (November 1980), p. 467. 
11 Khaled Abou el-Fadl, “The Orphan of Modernity and the Clash of Civilizations,” 
Global Dialogue, 4, 2 (Spring 2002). 
12  Ovamir Anjum, “Islam as A Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His 
Interlocutors,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 
27, No.3 (2007), p. 661. 
13 Ibid. 
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material life of those inhabiting them.”14 Defined as such, the Islamic 
discursive tradition is far from a systemic homogeneity. Instead, it is 
characterized by debates, disagreements and contestations.15  
Closely related to the idea of Islam as a discursive tradition is the 
concept of ‘orthodoxy’. While Asad does acknowledges orthodoxy, his 
use of this term is very different from the invocation of the same term 
by most Orientalists and anthropologists. As he notes, 
“Orthodoxy is crucial to all Islamic traditions. But the 
sense in which I use this term must be distinguished from 
the sense given to it by most orientalists and 
anthropologists. Anthropologists like El-Zein, who wish to 
deny any special significance to orthodoxy, and those like 
Gellner, who see it as a specific set of doctrines “at the 
heart of Islam,” both are missing something vital: that 
orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive 
relationship—a relationship of power. Wherever Muslims 
have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust 
correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine or 
replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy.”16 
The idea of Islam as ‘a discursive tradition’ as defined by Asad 
above is an important contribution to the discussion on Islam and its 
relationship with other traditions, including liberalism. There are three 
reasons for this. First, it locates the multivocality of Islam within 
certain shared point of reference, avoiding both the essentialization 
and extreme relativization of Islam. Second, it emphasizes the 
contested nature of Islamic discourse and the working of certain power 
relation within it; and third, while it acknowledges the role of human 
agency as the interpreters of the texts, it also stresses the constraining 
power of the discursive tradition itself.  
Liberalism and Political Liberalism 
Political philosophers often speak of two forms of liberalism: 
comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism. The first is a way of 
                                                 
14  Ovamir Anjum, “Islam as A Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His 
Interlocutors,” p. 661 
15  Sean McLoughlin, “Islam(s) in Context: Orientalism and the Anthropology of 
Muslim Societies and Cultures,” Journal of Beliefs & Values, 28, 3 (December 2007), pp. 
273-296. 
16 Talal Asad, “The Idea of Anthropology of Islam,” pp. 15-6. 
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life, a theory of value, and an epistemology.17 The latter, by contrast, is 
purely a doctrine of social and political cooperation. It seeks to 
elaborate “the most reasonable public conception of justice and 
citizenship for free and equal persons, given the existence of 
disagreement on the ultimate meaning of life and the epistemological 
foundation for discovering it.”18  
John Rawls has over the years become one of main contributors to 
the conceptualization of political liberalism and its differentiation from 
comprehensive liberalism. Rawls makes the distinction between 
comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines, on the one hand, 
and his conceptions limited to “the political” on the other. The 
underlying concern of his conceptualization of political liberalism is 
formulated in the following question:  
“How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly 
divided by reasonable though incompatible religions, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?”19  
Political liberalism, as a political conception of justice, is basically 
Rawls’ answer to this question. Rawls acknowledges that 
comprehensive religious or moral doctrines of “the good” –such as 
Islam, liberalism and socialism –are necessarily incompatible as a 
matter of philosophical truth. Nevertheless, despite their irreconcilable 
philosophical differences, adherents of conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines may agree with, and build, what he calls “overlapping 
                                                 
17 Scholars have competing claims as to whether liberalism constitute a single, coherent 
project. Jeffrey Stout, for example, dismisses the unifying notion of a single liberal 
project arguing that liberalism should be the “name for a particular kind of obsolete 
ideology whose critics and defenders thought there was something worth calling the 
liberal project and who therefore engaged in fruitless debates over whether it was a 
good or bad thing. Others, such as Talal Asad, on the other hand, have argued for the 
unifying and common political and moral language of liberalism despite the tension 
inherent to it. See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) and Talal Asad, Formation of Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) 
18 Andrey F. March, “The Demands of Citizenship: Translating Political Liberalism 
into the Language of Islam,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 
(December 2005), p. 401. 
19 John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), p. xvi 
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consensus” on certain fundamental points related to political 
organizations and social cooperation.20  
Rawls thus advances his political liberalism with a practical aim. “It 
presents itself as a conception of justice that may be shared by citizens 
as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement”.21  
But for this to happen, Rawls argues, it should be, as far as possible, 
“independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and 
religious doctrines that citizens affirm.”22 The political conception of 
justice, as a result, is “formally and functionally impartial, seeking to 
neither advance nor diminish any single comprehensive doctrine.”23  
With this ‘neutral’ normative position, Rawls’ political liberalism 
could be considered as more hospitable to religious traditions and the 
coexistence between the two is theoretically more possible. Some 
scholars, however, show that Ralws’ political liberalism still does not 
escape from certain liberal biases and preferences. Bowen, for 
example, suggests that intuition about North American institutions and 
sensibilities, in which values of individual autonomy and equality might 
be presumed to predominate, is discernible in Rawls’s formulation of 
justice.24 In a similar vein, Bhikhu Parekh argues that liberal doctrine of 
valuing autonomy and “the good life” are outcomes of a particular 
Western intellectual and social history, in which Greek philosophy, 
Christianity, and colonialism each contributed.25 Considering this 
social, historical and normative aspects of political liberalism, one can 
argue that its applicability in the contexts other than Western and 
advanced democracies might be limited.26 In fact, Rawls’ conception 
                                                 
20 Mohammad Fadel, “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: the Theological and 
Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law,” Research Paper, University of 
Toronto Legal Studies Series (2007), pp. 4-5. 
21 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 9. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Khaled A. Beydoun, “Laicite, Liberalism and the Headscarf,” Journal of Islamic Law 
and Culture, 10, 2, Month (2008), p. 194. 
24  John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11. 
25 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
26  Mehmet Fevzi Bilgin, “The Prospect for Political Liberalism in Non-Western 
Societies,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10, 3 (September 
2007), p. 375. 
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and its application are so specific to the United States that they may 
not easily resonates with other societies, especially postcolonial Islamist 
societies in Africa and Asia.27  
Another aspect of Rawls’ political liberalism which might be also 
problematic is his notion of “public reason”.28 Rawls distinguishes 
between the scope of public reason and what he calls the “background 
culture” of civil society, which includes such associations as churches, 
universities and the like.29 According to Rawls, citizens have the right 
to ground their views in their comprehensive doctrines or broad 
worldviews, like religion, morality, or philosophy, but such doctrines 
should be presented as public reason. While he still considers the 
possibility of invoking comprehensive doctrines in public life, he limits 
this possibility in the ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason 
itself.30 For this reason, some assert that Rawls’ public reason is clearly 
liberal in character and hence refer to it as a liberal public reason.31  
One main problem with this liberal public reason is its tendency to 
ignore the complex and contingent relationship between religion and 
politics. As Asad reminds us, religion and politics has always been 
involved in the world of power, and that “the categories of ‘politics’ 
and ‘religion’ turn to implicate each other more profoundly than we 
thought”.32 As he explains: 
“While the modern idea of a secular society involves a 
distinctive relation between state law and personal morality, 
with the result their religion becomes a matter of (private) 
                                                 
27 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 101. 
28 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 212-254. 
29 Ibid., 443 
30 Ibid. According to Rawls, the proper domain of public reason is the “public political 
forum,” which provides for three different discourses to take place: “the discourse of 
judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse 
of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the 
discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in 
their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements.” See Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, p. 443. 
31 Raja Bahlul, “Toward Islamic Conception of Public Reason,” Journal Islamic Law and 
Society, 12, 1 (Spring 2003), p. 56. 
32  Talal Asad, Formation of Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
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belief, its translation into a legal right the individual’s ability 
to express and practice his or her beliefs freely brings 
‘religion’ back into the public domain”.  
Islam and Liberalism in Indonesia: An Evolving Discourse 
Despite the fact that Muslims are a huge majority in Indonesia, the 
country has been from its inception, and still is, a ‘secular’ state. 
Having played an important role in anti-colonial resistance since the 
very beginning of the nationalist movements, Islam nevertheless was 
excluded from the framework of Indonesian nationhood and a more 
‘secular’ state ideology, Pancasila, was chosen by postcolonial 
Indonesian leaders as the foundation of the newly born nation.33 
Proposals and attempts to officially establish link between Islam and 
the state has frequently failed for the lack of popular and political 
support.34  
Secular-nationalist-oriented Indonesian nationhood has then 
dominated political discourse and practice in the country for most of 
its history. As with Marxism, Islamism has been discursively and 
constitutionally marginalized from the state power and ideology. 
During the Soekarno era and at least the first two decades of 
Soeharto’s regime, political Islam has never been let to dominate 
national politics and political organizations committed to explicitly 
Islamic goals have never been able to attract sufficient popular 
support.35 
This general historical and political context and the New Order’s 
repression on political and ideological Islam in the first two decades of 
his rule had a significant impact on the development of Islamic 
political discourse in the country. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
scholars on Indonesian Islam have noticed the emergence of a ‘new’ 
Islamic thinking which is liberal and progressive in character among 
certain Muslim intellectuals. Identified variously by different scholars 
                                                 
33 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politic and Religious Renewal 
in Muslim Southeast Asia,” in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds), Politics 
and Religious Renewal in Muslim  Southeast Asia (University of Hawai’i Press: Honolulu, 
1997), p. 21. 
34 Ibid., p. 122. 
35 See Robert W. Hefner, “Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era,” in Adam 
Schwartz and Jonathan Paris (eds), The Politics of Post-Soeharto Indonesia (Council on 
Foreign Relation Press: New York, 1999). 
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as “Islamic neo-modernism”,36 “civil Islam”,37 “cultural Islam”,38 
“liberal Islam” or “progressive Islam”, 39 this new Islamic thinking 
consistently claims that “the modern ideals of equality, freedom, and 
democracy are not uniquely Western values, but modern necessities 
compatible with, and even required by, Muslim ideals”.40 This stream 
of Islamic thinking has spontaneously developed in both 
“traditionalist” circle and “modernist” camp.41  
From a comparative Islamic perspective, the degree to which 
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals are engaged with modern ideas such as 
democracy, pluralism, human rights and civil society is remarkable. As 
Hefner notes, instead of secular nationalists, it is reform-minded 
Muslim intellectuals “who have been the largest audience and 
supporters for democratic and pluralist ideas in Indonesia since the 
1980s.”42 He even suggests that “nowhere in the Muslim world have 
Muslim intellectuals engaged ideas of democracy, human rights, 
pluralism, civil society and the rule of law with a vigour and confidence 
equal to that of Indonesian Muslims.”43Another scholar affirms 
Hefner’s assertion suggesting that Islamic liberalism “has imprinted 
itself, not only on Islamic discourse, but also on the general national 
discourse.”44 
                                                 
36 Greg Barton, “The Impact of Neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The 
Emergence of a New Pluralism,” in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), Democracy 
in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University), pp. 143-50. 
37  Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2000), p. 216. 
38 Greg Fealy, “Islamisation and Politics in Southeast Asia: the Constrasting Cases of 
Malaysia and Indonesia”, in Nelly Laboud and Anthony H. Johns (eds), Islam in World 
Politics (London: Routledge, 2005). 
39 Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension 
(Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004). 
40  Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion: 
Indonesia’s Approaching Elections,” Journal of Democracy, 15, 1 (2004), p. 117. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Hefner, “Islam in an Era of Nation-State,” p. 50. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia, p. 12. 
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It is within this remarkable engagement with the ideas of 
democratic and pluralism that this Muslim group has played a 
prominent role in accepting and supporting Pancasila as the final 
foundation of Indonesia’s nationhood and its political implications, 
especially with regard to the non-sectarian and harmonious relations 
between the various faiths.45 In the post-Soeharto era, civil or liberal 
Muslim group and their descendants seems to enhance further their 
strength and influences by holding many key positions in government 
and civil society. They are responsible in various ways for wide 
opposition to state enforcement of shari >` ah.46   
The post-New Order Indonesia, however, has not only seen the 
continuing strength of liberal and progressive orientation of Islamic 
thinking and movement. A more ideological, political, literal and 
violent expression of Islam have also made their way into a more open 
political and public sphere. While at constitutional and political level, 
the attempt to establish the formal link between state and shari>` ah has 
once again failed to attract sufficient popular support, the struggle for 
shari >` ah is still far from over. Given the minimum political support for 
inclusion of shari>` ah provisions into the constitution, the struggle for 
shari>` ah continues with the focus “no longer on how to bring Islam 
into the foundation of the state, but how to bring Islamic coloration 
into policies produced by the state”.47  
The rise of more formalistic and exclusive Islamic discourse and 
groups has forced the younger liberal and progressive Muslim 
intellectuals to voice their liberal religious and political discourse in a 
more public and organized way. In January 2001, a number of younger 
Muslim intellectuals formed an intellectual network linking “different 
intellectuals and activists concerned with liberal interpretations of 
Islamic teachings to counter the fundamentalist discourse and 
movement”.48 The term of ‘Liberal Islam Network’ or Jaringan Islam 
                                                 
45 Emanuel Sivan, “The Clash within Islam,” Survival, 45, 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 25-44. 
46 Mujani and Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion,” pp. 109-123. 
47  Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future 
Trajectory”, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September/October 2004), p. 669 
48 Muhamad Ali, “The Rise of JIL in Contemporary Indonesia”, The American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences, 22, 1, p. 4 
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Liberal (JIL) was then deliberately picked up as the formal name of the 
network.49 
There was a lively internal debate among JIL activists and 
supporters over the meaning of “liberal Islam”, particularly regarding 
what liberal should imply. At some points, it was clear that their 
understanding of terms such as “liberal” “left”, and “conservative” is 
relative, and differs from the understanding of many non-Indonesians 
as well as their critics in Indonesia.50 Some of them suggested, for 
example, that “liberal” must be differentiated from “liberalism” in the 
sense that in Western thinking, liberalism is often identified with the 
right, whereas in the discourse of Islamic thinking liberal Islam is 
associated with movements of the left.51  
While different interpretations of ‘liberal Islam’ remain to exist, JIL 
activists eventually seemed to agree on the spirit of freedom of 
thought and expression.52 They read and were inspired by Kurzman’s 
Liberal Islam: A Source Book, in which he uses liberal Islam to refer to 
basic themes in the history of liberalism, such as democracy, freedom 
of thought, social equality and human progress.53 While they might be 
also familiar with Leonard Binder’ Islamic Liberalism (1988), JIL 
activists,  according to Ali, seems to be inspired more by Kurzman 
than by Binder while defining and formulating liberal Islam.54 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 5. 
50 Virginia Hooker, “Developing Islamic Arguments for Change through ‘Liberal 
Islam’,” in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds), Islamic Perspectives on the New 
Millenium (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 236. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ali, ‘The Rise of JIL in Contemporary Indonesia’, p. 4. 
53  In his introduction, Kurzman traces the historical development of liberal Islam 
within two centuries long tradition of socio-religious interpretation in the Islamic 
world, defining liberal Islam as tradition of interpretation critical of two previously 
dominant traditions: customary and revivalist Islam. He further divides liberal Islam 
into three different modes: “liberal shari>’ah”, “silent shari>’ah” and ‘interpreted shari>’ah”. 
See Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam: A Source Book (New York: Oxford University 
Press,1998), p. 4-5. 
54 Muhamad Ali, 5. Quite different from Kurzman, Binder uses the term “Islamic 
liberalism” or “liberal Islam” interchangeably in the political context and define them 
rather loosely. For him, all traditions in the interpretation of Islam, which is based on 
human reasoning or rational discourse, can be labelled Islamic liberalism. In the 
context of Middle East politics, he differenciates between Islamic liberalism, which 
argues that the idea of a liberal Islamic state is possible and desirable not only because 
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Certain liberal political discourses are clearly formulated and 
promoted by JIL activists. JIL, for example, considers matter of being 
religious or being not religious as a personal right that should be 
protected by the state. Moreover, JIL believes in the separation of 
religious power and political authority. In a way that is similar, 
although not identical, to a kind of political liberalism as 
conceptualized by Rawls, JIL activists believe that religion functions in 
private and individual spaces. With regard to public affairs, they argue 
for a “collective ijtihad” process, when everyone can debate and every 
truth is determined inductively through the fit and proper test of 
vision.55  
JIL’s political ideas and discourses clearly have strong roots in 
political discourses popularized and promoted by the older generation 
of liberal and progressive Muslims since the 1970s and 1980s. Their 
more expressive and deliberate use of liberal political idioms and their 
more persistent discourse about “rethinking Islam” with liberal 
interpretations, however, has invited harsher criticism and opposition, 
mostly from emerging ‘Islamist’ and ‘radical’ groups. The latter groups 
harshly accuse JIL of deviating from Islamic principles for their 
consistent opposition to conventional interpretations of shari>` ah and 
attempts at attaining a more public position for political Islam in 
Indonesia.56  
The criticism and unwelcome response, however, also come from 
certain factions of the mainstream moderate Islamic groups such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah. While remain generally regarded as the 
backbone of Islamic moderation in the country, NU and 
Muhammadiyah contain within them increasingly fragmented 
                                                                                                      
such a liberal, democratic state accords with the spirit of Islam, but especially because 
Islam has few specific requirements or guidance on this issue, and “scripturalist 
liberalism” which justifies liberal institutions based on “explicit Islamic legislation of 
divine origin,” not on liberal political, epistemological and moral principles. See 
Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago, London: 
the University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 243-4. 
55 Nurdin, “Islam and State”, p. 35 
56 Timothy P. Daniels, ‘Liberals, Moderates and Jihadists: Protecting Danish Cartoons 
in Indonesia’, Contemporary Islam, 1, 1 (October 2007), pp. 240-1. For a further account 
on intellectual and discursive contestation between “liberal Islam” and “anti-liberal 
Islam” in Indonesia, see Akh Muzzaki, “Current Debate in the Post-Soeharto 
Indonesian Islam: Examining the Intellectual Base of Liberal and Anti-Liberal Islamic 
Movement,” Al-Jami’ah, 45, 2 (2007), pp. 322-366. 
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constituencies as manifested in their competing response towards 
liberal religious discourses.57 Within NU, for example, ideas such as 
secularism, liberalism, and pluralism have recently come under attack. 
Similarly, Muhammadiyah has recently experienced internal tensions 
between those espousing some liberal notions and those staunchly 
committed to shari >` ah-oriented perspective.58  
It is clear then that liberalism is still highly contested and its 
blending with Islamic discourse has been met by conflicting responses 
among different Muslim groups in Indonesia. It does not mean, 
however, that liberal Islamic discourse is becoming marginalized or 
losing its ground. Liberal Islamic discourse in one way or another had 
probably been a more powerful, if not hegemonic, discourse in 
Indonesia since the 1970s until late 1990s. Yet, despite the rise of the 
rivalling radical and literal Islamic discourses in the aftermath of 
Soeharto era, it continues to be an influential intellectual movement in 
the country.  
Assyaukanie, a leading JIL’s activists, affirms this continuing 
importance of liberal Islamic thinking by suggesting that secularization, 
which during the 1970s was condemned, is now becoming a central 
theme in the current political debates among the younger generation of 
santri Muslims.59 He even goes further by confirming and at the same 
time refining Harry J. Benda’s thesis on history of Indonesia. While 
Benda, in the 1950s, predicted that the history of Indonesia is the 
extension of santri civilization, Assyaukanie contends that “the history 
of Indonesia is the expansion of liberal and progressive santri 
civilization”.60 The fact that various attempts to establish a more 
formal link between Islam or shari >` ah and state has been lacking a 
unified political and popular support could be partly attributed to the 
strength of democratic and liberal voice in the country. This does not 
                                                 
57 Ibid., p. 240. 
58  See Timothy P. Daniels, 241. For a more detailed account of NU and 
Muhammadiyah response to liberalism, especially, following the recent fatwa 
prohibiting pluralism, secularism and liberalism by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or 
Council of Indonesian Ulama, see Pier Gillespie, ‘Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: 
Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Pluralism, 
Liberalism and Secularism’ Journal of Islamic Studies, 18, 2 (2007), pp. 202-240. 
59 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 230. 
60 Ibid., p. 231. 
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necessarily means, however, that there is no signs or trends of the 
contrary. 
What is important to note here, however, is that although 
democratic and liberal in character, the political discourse forged by 
liberal Muslims is not merely, and not always, derivative of Western 
liberalism. As noted by Hefner, some of the emphases of 
contemporary civil or liberal Islam in Indonesia show a different mix 
of ideas and themes than those of contemporary liberals in the secular 
West.61 For Hefner, in its emphasis on public virtue and justice, for 
example, civil or liberal Islam is much closer to the traditions of civic 
republicanism rather than secular liberalism.62 Thus in a broader term, 
liberal Islamic discourse in Indonesia represents more a strong support 
for Jose Casanova’s thesis that religious movements can be 
progressive, inclusive and actively engaged in the public discourse 
whilst at the same time supporting secular liberal democracy.63 
It is in this sense that the support for ‘political liberalism’ in 
Indonesia developed without necessarily following Rawlsian ‘liberal’ 
public reason. As observed by Bowen, religious reasoning and 
arguments have been strongly influential in the political discourse of 
liberal Muslim in Indonesia.64 The political debates often involve and 
invoke Islamic terms in efforts to interpret religious texts in such a way 
that are compatible with other doctrines, including liberal ones. More 
importantly, the reasoning of liberal and progressive ideas rooted in an 
Islamic context and anchored in Islamic beliefs has been partly 
responsible for their growing support.65 In these instances, Indonesian 
liberal Muslims endorse, not a political conception of justice as in 
Rawls, but, as Bowen puts it, “a reasonable conception of justice that is 
public and also Islamic.”66  
 
                                                 
61 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 190. 
62 Ibid., p. 191. 
63 See Jose Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994). 
64 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality: An Athropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 265. 
65 Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia, p. 284 
66 Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality, p. 265 
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Conclusion 
This paper has shown that a more nuanced understanding of Islam 
and liberalism is needed in order to avoid essentialized accounts on the 
contingent, complex relationship between the two. Understanding 
Islam, like any other religion, as multivocal entity is certainly 
important, but this should also be accompanied by an awareness of the 
working of certain power relation within a distinctively Islamic 
discursive tradition that renders particular discourse acceptable, 
dominant or hegemonic. Talal Asad’s idea of Islam as ‘a discursive 
tradition’ is particularly important in this respect.  
On the other hand, important development in contemporary 
liberalism such as the distinction between its comprehensive nature 
and its more limited political conception as elaborated by John Rawls 
also merits further scrutiny in the discussion on Islam and liberalism. 
Rawls’ conceptualization of political liberalism in particular can be 
critically deployed in examining the degree to which Muslims have 
accepted certain kind of liberal political premises in developing a 
democratic political order, without necessarily pushing religion and 
religious reason into a limited private sphere.  
Reviewing the evolving relationship between Islam and liberalism 
in Indonesia, the paper has also shown that liberal political discourse 
has a strong resonance among major Islamic groups. The support of 
the state ‘neutrality’ and the opposition to the imposition of shari >` ah by 
the state, in particular, has been widely and continuesly supported, 
although by no means it has settled once for all and without some 
signs of the contrary. It could be argued that there has been a growing 
support for what is similar, but not identical, to Rawlsian political 
liberalism. The way Indonesian liberal and moderate Muslims develop 
and support an ‘overlapping consensus’, however, does not match 
Rawlsian liberal notion of political conception of justice and public 
reason. Instead of a purely liberal political conception of justice and 
public reason, what is growing and gaining support for some time in 
Indonesia is a conception of justice which combines Islamic and 
democratic ideals. [] 
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